

**Apples and Oranges?: recruiting indigenous Mexicans
to divide farm labor markets in the western US.**

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Abstract

In recent decades the composition of a variety of farm labor markets has shifted from mestizo to indigenous Mexicans. "Ethnic replacement" began when growers cultivated new network contacts to maintain substandard working conditions in the face of efforts by union activists and the State to reform these labor markets. I will provide two cases at different stages of development. While the Mixtec have come to dominate the San Joaquin Valley's citrus industry in California, Purepecha harvesters are beginning to add the Yakima Valley's apple harvest in Washington state to their migrant circuit. Using field data from both sides of the international border my paper: 1) describes how and why employers manipulate the networks that migrants use to obtain their preferred workforce; 2) argues that the model scholars use to study migration has led to the neglect of the role of employers; 3) presents a new approach to the study of international migration; and, 4) provides two case study networks to illustrate the dynamic process by which new migrants gain entry to these labor markets. I conclude that this study of ethnic replacement supports "labor demand" theory as the best explanation for the persistence of large-scale migrant flows such as those from Mexico to the US.

Introduction

The composition of the workforce in farm labor markets across the US has been shifting from one distinct set of Mexicans to another. Those considered mestizo are losing jobs to others that may claim indigenous orientations.ⁱ The switch to indigenous workers in the eastern US is but the latest in a rapid succession of ethnic groups passing through those labor markets in the past few decades.ⁱⁱ Growers in the western US, however, have relied on mestizo fieldhands for the past century; yet their recent tilt toward indigenous workers is more pronounced.ⁱⁱⁱ In the face of workforce stability, why and how is ethnic replacement taking place in the US west?

The main reason *why* labor markets undergo sudden ethnic shifts has already been well documented.^{iv} By and large, employers will only risk destabilizing their workforce to maintain strict control over the terms of employment. Aside from providing another empirical case supporting that conclusion, an analysis of recent changes in America's farm labor markets can help explain *how* new immigrants are rapidly incorporated into a labor-receiving nation. An extensive literature concurs that such changes are facilitated by the social networks used by the new workers (e.g., Waldinger, 1996; Lamphere, 1994). But the current "migrant network" model focuses almost exclusively on actors native to the labor-sending hometowns, in spite of the role employers play in fomenting ethnic replacement in immigrant-dominated labor markets.

The "supply-side" tilt of the migrant network paradigm needs to be redressed (Krissman, n.d.). The current model effectively "blames the victims" of socioeconomic integration. The demand of the employers in advanced capitalist nations for low cost labor is critical to the development of many large-scale migrant flows (Piore, 1979). This "demand-side" can be revealed by adding employers and their sundry recruitment agents to the networks that migrants use to leave their hometowns, cross a militarized border, and establish new lives abroad.

I will use an alternative model to study two networks that funnel increasing numbers of indigenous Mexican workers into farm labor markets in the western US. The Mixtec of Oaxaca now predominate in the citrus harvests in California, while the Purepecha of Michoacan are making inroads into Washington state's apple harvest labor market. Comparing apples and oranges illustrates why growers may suddenly recruit a new and distinct workforce, and reveals how the personnel practices of employers influence the development of migration networks.

Using field data from both sides of the international border,^v my paper: 1) describes how the networks migrants depend on are used by employers to maintain substandard labor markets; 2) discusses the failure of the prevailing model to describe the process of international migration; 3) proposes an alternative approach; and; 4) illustrates these arguments via two case studies.

I. Employers, New Immigrants, and Labor Market Entry

Much of the labor employed throughout the world is not procured in the way theorized by neoclassical economists (Brass, 1997:20-24). Instead of the voluntary and informed entry of willing workers into regional labor markets, the processes used to recruit "illegal aliens" (i.e., undocumented workers), indentured servants, and slaves have persisted or even expanded; all of these people are "unfree" workers (Bales, 2000; Brass, 1997). Employers various explanations of their labor practices merely amount to a redefinition of "free labor" (Peck, 2000). Many US employers resort to nonmarket mechanisms to obtain workers for a variety of labor markets.

David Griffith (1987), for example, found that the employers in two labor markets on the eastern seaboard use one of two nonmarket mechanisms to recruit and supervise their workers. He argued that the network contacts of current employees are utilized by seafood processors, while the State is used by growers to obtain new workers. As demonstrated below, both mechanisms are actually used by US growers to maintain a low cost workforce. Jane Haney (1979) analyzed the two types of nonmarket processes discussed by Griffith in a useful way. She recognized that the manipulation of the network contacts of employees by their employers was "informal recruitment", while State-sponsored programs to import new immigrant workers was "formal recruitment". Most immigration studies only recognize the latter as recruitment, considering the former voluntary.⁶ However, both practices provide unfree labor if the workers obtained are bound to their jobs involuntarily⁷ (Krissman, 1997). I found considerable evidence of unfree labor in several farm labor markets in the western US (Krissman, 1999).

On the one hand, a number of studies suggest that the Mixtec have been used by Californian growers primarily to displace union activists and their supporters from regional farm labor markets.⁸ On the other hand, even though the Teamsters and the United Farm Workers (UFW) unions recently targeted Washington's apple industry, growers there are welcoming the Purepecha primarily to ensure continued access to migrant workers even as the State ratchets up the militarization of the border.⁹ However, with annual worker turnover rates of more than 60 percent, representatives from both crop industries also view a continuous flow of new migrants into their labor markets as critical to maintaining current conditions (Krissman, 1999).

I have argued (e.g., Krissman, 2001) that growers continue to recruit new immigrant workers in an effort to stave off meaningful labor market reform, whether by labor activists or the State. Divisions within the workforce along class, legal status, and ethnic lines aid in their effort, by weakening worker solidarity.¹⁰ All three cleavages persist in the apple and orange industries (Krissman, 1999). While class and legal status do divide the workforce, these distinctions crosscut the mestizo and indigenous populations (and even the members of families and households). Thus, class and legal status have the potential to unite at least portions of the two ethnic groups (e.g., harvesters, if not supervisory personnel). But ethnicity can relegate all mestizos and all indigenous Mexicans into distinct camps, unwilling to cooperate even in mutual self-interest. Therefore, ethnic differences are a unique weapon in the arsenal of management. When all three variables are combined, worker solidarity is much more difficult to attain.

Immigrants are particularly susceptible to the nonmarket mechanisms used by many employers to obtain new workers. Indeed, media reports reveal that many of the foreign workers obtained through the network contacts of employees or by State sponsorship are trafficked, indentured, or even enslaved.¹¹ There is a vast literature documenting the use of these nonmarket mechanisms to obtain immigrant labor around the world, including from Mexico to the US.¹² But I will draw primarily on the now classic *Return to Aztlan* (1987) to provide evidence of both nonmarket mechanisms because this book epitomizes a paradox pervading immigration studies.

Douglas Massey, Rafael Alarcon, Jorge Durand, and Humberto Gonzalez introduced the prevailing "migrant network" in *Return to Aztlan*. Data in this text also offer abundant evidence in support of a demand-side approach to the study of the networks that migrants use. Yet the model that the authors promoted to analyze "the social process of international migration from western Mexico"¹³ systematically excludes the actors that generate (and in large part facilitate) the continued demand for new immigrant workers.

Immigration scholars routinely note that the US government recruited about 5 million farm workers from Mexico during a twenty-two year period.¹⁴ It is also widely acknowledged that many US employers evaded the regulations of the formal program by enticing workers to come north without contracts, initiating the first large-scale flow of "illegal" immigrants from Mexico (Galarza, 1964). Indeed, the US government responded to this informal recruitment by launching its first major military-style campaign, "Operation Wetback", against a migrant flow. The State targeted the foreign workers rather than the US employers that encouraged their illegal entry; more than a million Mexicans were deported even as State responded to employers' cries of labor shortages by importing more than 300,000 Braceros (Krissman, 1995). Nevertheless, the informal effort during this era may have exceeded the number of workers with Bracero contracts.

The formal program and its informal counterpart played a major role in the development of networks linking the peoples across to a broad swath of Mexico to farm jobs in the western US. The majority of Braceros came from four states in west-central Mexico, now regarded as largely populated by mestizo inhabitants. This region also contains the four Mexican case study communities used in *Return to Aztlan*. Massey and colleagues noted that in one labor-sending community "[t]he institutionalization of the migrant networks during the Bracero era considerably reduced the costs and risks associated with US migration and made it accessible to everyone, young and old, male and female, poor and rich" (Massey et al, 1987:61). Large-scale flows that have emanated for decades from scores of communities in western Mexico have their origins and/or consolidation in the

recruitment efforts of the Bracero period (e.g., Mines, 1981). A case study in the US also noted that the long-lived migrant networks between Mexican hometowns and rural Michigan have their roots in the Bracero era (Haney, 1979:144).

Jane Haney's analysis went much further than that of most immigration scholars. She recognized that growers in Michigan did not resign themselves to the loss of low cost labor in the absence of formal recruitment by the US State. Instead, farmers used another strategy to maintain existing networks and to create new ones throughout the last century – before, during, and after the Bracero era (Haney, 1979:146). Typically, growers either personally encouraged Mexican migrants to come north when workers were needed, or they hired labor intermediaries to recruit workers for them. In either case, informal recruitment involved using the network contacts of former and current employees to obtain new workers. I documented informal recruitment by employers and their labor agents in three different billion dollar crop industries in the US west – in table grapes, as well as apples and oranges (Krissman, 2000). But a more diverse set of examples were provided in *Return to Aztlan*. This book described how informal recruitment brought migrants to jobs in both the farm and nonfarm sectors of the US economy.

Return to Aztlan stressed a crucial juncture, which ensures the development of a large-scale flow between a specific Mexican town and a certain location in the US. This occurs when an employer targets a migrant to help obtain new workers (Massey et al, 1987:169). Migrants tapped by their American bosses typically recommend other residents from their hometowns (especially relatives and friends). Over time, individual firms and even regional industries can become dominated by immigrant workers, and a disproportionate number may be from the same region or hometown.¹⁵ Although identified as pivotal to the development of any migrant network, Massey and colleagues did not report how and why these employers hired large numbers of migrants from the four hometowns that the researchers studied.

Other scholars, however, have argued that US employers may hire through migration networks to lower costs, raise productivity, and/or evade labor market reforms.¹⁶ Most labor agents are true minority middlemen (Bonacich, 1973). On the one hand, these supervisory personnel are indebted to their patrons for the opportunity to achieve upward mobility in labor markets with narrow, short job ladders. On the other hand, these agents have a great deal of leverage over the new migrants they have recruited. Any preexisting social relations between the agent and workers may ensure compliance in the workplace. *Return to Aztlan* suggested this:

The pay of the foreman depended on the quantity and quality of his team's work. His preference for paisanos [from his hometown] stemmed not only from his affective ties with friends and former neighbors but also from the greater control he was able to exercise through the ties of kinship, friendship, and paisanaje. Drawing upon these bonds, he could elicit greater speed and quality from his workers without having to resort to coercive methods such as threatening or firing. In this way, a communality of interests between the foreman and workers was established, one that *primarily benefited* [sic] *the company for whom they all worked* (Massey et al, 1987:165, emphasis added).

Few immigration scholars have documented how employer manipulation of the contacts of workers may influence the development of the networks that migrant use. In the preceding quote the authors discuss the situation from the perspective of the immigrant foreman, and refer only indirectly to those that implemented the personnel practices that permit or require some employees to recruit the firm's workforce through migration networks. "The company", as used above, is a fig leaf to conceal employers. *People*, such as the firm owner or the shareholders and executives of the corporation, capture most of the wealth generated by this network recruitment. Yet these actors were glossed as an institution because they are deemed external to the network.

Haney (1979:141) noted that the labor recruitment strategies of US employers are "...an aspect of Mexican-US migration [often] not examined..." She called this neglected topic "...the other side of...international migration..." Yet again, though still indirectly, *Return to Aztlan* provided many clues. Massey and his colleagues found specific hometown people to be key to the development of

networks in all four of the Mexican communities. These “pioneer migrants” included several farm foremen, factory workers, and restaurant employees. A brief synopsis of ethnographic data (Massey et al, 1987:164-169) made clear that these pioneers became network conduits at the invitation or insistence of their US employers. For example, one pioneer migrant,

...a common laborer...was chosen as a foreman *on the condition* that he gather together a group of workers and take charge of supervising them...The [firm] owners arranged legal documentation for him and his family and they all settled in [a US] town. With time, other families [from his Mexican hometown]...began to settle in the [US] town and the surrounding area, attracted by the employment that this paisano could offer. Today this city has become the most important center of US employment for people from [this foreman’s hometown] (Massey et al, 1987:165, emphasis added).

Massey and colleagues derived an important conclusion from these data:

“Considering the four case studies in comparative perspective, most migrant networks can be traced back to the fortuitous employment of some key individual. *All that is necessary for a migrant network to develop is for one person to be in the right place at the right time and obtain a position that allows him to distribute jobs and favors to others from his community* (Massey et al, 1987:169, emphasis added).

This last passage pinpoints the principal cause for the development of migrant networks. The vast majority of adult Mexicans migrate to the US in order to find gainful employment, or to join family members that went there to work. Therefore, large-scale flows are most likely to occur when the would-be migrants know that specific jobs await them in the labor-receiving nation.

In the post-Bracero era, the recruitment of new workers from Mexico has accelerated. Tens of thousands of former Braceros and their families received residency papers (so-called “green cards”) from the US State in the 1960s and ‘70s. Legalizing the former guest workers further institutionalized links between Mexican hometowns and US labor-receiving regions, and set the stage for demographic transformations throughout much of the US west (e.g., Rochin and Castillo, 1993). Shifting demographics contributed to the rise of a reactionary “nativism” against Latinos in rural Washington (*Economist*), as well as in California (Krissman, 2002).

These workers swelled labor markets such as those in western agriculture, and threatened to undermine a nascent farm workers’ movement (Fineberg, 1971). However, when a critical mass of mestizos – Mexican Americans, former Braceros, and undocumented migrants alike – joined together under the banner of the United Farm Workers in the 1970s, growers in California used other strategies to maintain control of the labor markets (Taylor, 1975, Majka and Majka, 1982). One already tried-and-true scheme was ethnic replacement of portions of the workforce.

New recruitment activities led to a doubling of the major labor-sending states in Mexico, with much of the new flow coming from the more indigenous areas of Mexico (Cornelius, 1993). Hundreds of Mexican hometowns first began contributing workers to this binational migration stream only in the post-1965 era. The prominent role of non-hometown actors has been revealed in the study of indigenous migrants from Oaxaca. Researchers have documented continuing recruitment by agents for US-financed agribusinesses in north Mexico, as well as by farm labor contractors (FLCs) and sharecroppers increasingly preferred by Californian growers in the post-Bracero era.¹⁷ The active recruitment of Mexican workers did not end in 1965, despite the claims of Zabin et al (1993:93), Massey et al (1987:40-44) and Portes and Bach (1985:5-7). Rather, as Haney (1979) demonstrated, employers have merely shifted from formal to informal recruitment strategies – or, as Griffith (1987) argued, from one nonmarket mechanism to another. The result has been the continued ability of employers to obtain low cost, unfree, immigrant labor.

II. Labor Recruiters and the “Migrant Network” Concept

The various actors (i.e., US employers and sundry recruitment agents, including agents of the

US State) involved in the development of migration networks were discussed above. However, the prevailing migration paradigm (see **Figure 1**), which I will refer to as the “Massey model” in a nod to its most prolific proponent, cannot capture these dynamics. The Massey model is best represented as a pyramid of nested *groups* (kin and hometown associates of various types). Its proponents tacitly acknowledge that the model is ahistorical; that is, they admit that the migrant network concept cannot explain how these self-same networks originate (Massey et al, 1993:448 and 1994:728). I argue below that the Massey model cannot address the origins of networks because it does not include non-hometown actors, such as those that generate demand for immigrant labor and those that respond to the demand by recruiting new immigrants.

Douglas Massey and his various coauthors *have* mentioned “nonmigrants” and “friends of migrants” in connection with the Massey model:

Migrant networks are sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and nonmigrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community of origin. They increase the likelihood of international movement because they lower the costs and risks of movement and increase the expected net returns to migration.

Network connections constitute a form of social capital that people can draw upon to gain access to foreign employment. (Massey *et al.*, 1993:448)

Unfortunately, the nonmigrants actually discussed always turn out to be potential (in a word, *would-be*) migrants from the migrants’ hometowns, while the only friends described are also from these hometowns. When the Massey model is used, the study of the development of migrant networks is usually restricted to those with a “shared community of origin”; the only “interpersonal ties...in destination areas” analyzed systematically involve individuals from the same natal communities. Most immigration scholars neglect recruitment activities and the role of labor demand because this influential model ignores social relations with non-hometown actors.

There is one remarkable but woefully undeveloped deviation from a strictly endogamous approach. This “exception that proves the rule” (Buchanan, 1980:19) merits reprinting verbatim:

The emergence of daughter communities also produces a qualitative change in the concept of *paisanaje*. With the emergence of US settlements, [Mexican] men begin to acquire American-born wives and father a generation of sons and daughters born in the United States. The ideal of *paisanaje* must, therefore, be expanded to incorporate a class of people not born in the home community (Massey et al, 1987:162).

While *paisanaje* was nominally expanded, the implications of including these non-hometown actors in the migrant networks were not further considered. There was no discussion of how new kindreds created through marriage exogamy influence *paisanaje* in particular, or migrant networks generally. No other non-hometown actors have been incorporated into the model.

The assumption of network endogamy is supported by sampling Massey’s publications. My review of his collaborations did not uncover useful “ethnosurvey data” (see Massey, 1987) from or about individuals *not* born in the migrants’ hometowns. Most revealing was the article “What’s Driving Mexico-US Migration: a theoretical, empirical, and policy analysis.”

Douglas Massey and Kristin Espinosa (1997:945, 946) wielded forty-one variables to test many of the theories about migration which had been discussed in Massey *et al.* (1993 and 1994). 85 percent of these variables relied on ethnosurvey data (which had grown in the decade since the publication of *Return to Aztlan* from the populations of four to twenty-five Mexican communities). However, Massey and Espinosa did not use ethnosurvey data for six variables. In the case of the labor demand theory of Michael Piore (1979), for example, the coauthors used macro-scale data compiled by the US Department of Labor.¹⁸ Their decision to test labor demand without recourse to the data painstakingly taken from 4,853 informants demonstrates that their surveys lack adequate information about actors that are not native to the migrants’ hometowns.

Massey and Espinosa (1997:988) themselves deemed their “...indicator of labor demand ...not very good.” However, they bemoaned the dearth of appropriate government data instead of admitting that the requisite information was not collected in their surveys. Their excuse is ironic,

since “[t]he ethnosurvey design was developed specifically to overcome the weaknesses of federal immigration statistics, and to produce valid, reliable, and interpretable information on the process of immigration to the United States” (Massey, 1987:1503). The problem for Massey and Espinosa article is the same for the migrant network literature in general – the importance of labor demand in stimulating migration flows has been overlooked because most researchers fail to collect the data that could demonstrate it.

The failure of Massey and Espinosa to test the labor demand theory is not due to the difficulty of obtaining such data with ethnosurvey methods. Rather, it is a result of deficiencies in the Massey model, which does not examine the entire process of international migration. Ethnographic and survey data *can* provide such information. Several scholars have identified important actors in migration networks that are not native to the migrants’ hometowns. These studies cannot be reviewed at length here (but, see Krissman, n.d.). Only one facet of their research efforts is mentioned: the involvement of non-native actors in the networks under study.

David Griffith and Ed Kissam (1995) found that farm labor contractors and their associates often create “artificial networks” that both assist and indenture new migrant workers that do not have access to “natural” hometown networks. Sarah Mahler (1995) noted that new migrants often rely on immigrants from other nations for a variety of services usually available within social networks. Tamar Wilson (1998) argued that new migrants often get better job leads from non-hometown coworkers and neighbors than from paisanos. Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo (2001) uncovered three parallel interactive networks operating in the domestic service labor market: those of employers, workers, and intermediaries.¹⁹

While all of the actors described above are based in the US, David Spener made the case for including labor smugglers, usually living in Mexico’s border zone, in their clients’ networks:

...[S]muggling enterprises do not just feed off or prey upon the migrant stream. Rather, they themselves are an integrated part of it. These enterprises are structured around tightly bound, transborder networks of trust that link Mexican immigrants in the US interior to friends and kin in the Mexican border cities, the ...[US] border cities, and the migrant sending regions in Mexico’s interior. This does not necessarily mean that migrants being smuggled and their smugglers are linked to one another in the same networks of kinship and *compadrazgo* – although some certainly are – but rather that *the activities of both are structured by similar bonds resulting from the migration process itself*. (Spener, 2001:133, 134 [emphasis added])

The inclusion of smugglers in transborder networks needs to be extended to a number of other crucial actors within international networks that are not native to the migrants’ hometowns.

In sum, five recent studies have added a variety of non-hometown actors to the networks that migrants use to go from their homelands and settle in the US: labor smugglers (*coyotes*) and intermediaries (contractors and agencies), immigrants from other nations, American and immigrant coworkers and neighbors met in the labor-receiving nation, and current and prospective US employers. None of these actors is part of the “migrant network” model.

III. An Alternative Network Model and Research Method

The parameters of the migrant network are being skirted by immigration scholars in order to include all of their empirical data. But it is the utility of the paradigm that needs to be questioned. And, an alternative model that incorporates all the actors encountered during fieldwork needs to be put forward. I found that non-hometown actors influence the development of the migration networks that I have studied. I tried to analyze the effects of these actors on the networks that the migrants use while using to a model that excludes them (e.g., Krissman, 2000: 279). Finally, I drafted a new model – the “international migration network”²⁰ (see **Figure 2**).

The most important contribution of the international migration network is the ability to include any actors that new migrants may depend upon to make a successful transition from their hometowns to settlement in diverse locales in America. Researchers can add and subtract actors from those listed in Figure 2, depending upon the actual contacts revealed in fieldwork. But this alternative

does offer a framework to guide research in a cluttered binational landscape. There are other major differences between the alternative model and the prevailing paradigm.

The analysis of real networks requires the in-depth study of the important contacts of key individuals, regardless of anyone's place of origin, ethnicity, etc. These people are all studied because they all participate in various ways within actually existing networks. These networks have one purpose that unifies their participants – to facilitate international migration. However, the various actors participate for diverse reasons, not all of them are altruistic. This model promotes the examination of the diverse roles of all individuals (who are “points”, or actually, circles in Figure 2); the links between people (shown by the types of lines that connect them) document the basic nature of each relationship (e.g., reciprocal or asymmetrical).

The alternative model combines my review of the immigration and “social network analysis” literatures, along with the results of my own binational research. I sought an approach that would allow me to analyze all of my field data. The international migration network makes use of a method developed over the past half century by social network analysts that span the social and physical sciences.²¹ Judging by the lack of references to that literature, immigration scholars using the Massey model must be unaware of, or antagonistic to, social network analysis. Network analysis does have shortcomings – a number of “schools” with divergent jargon, and a tendency toward the “mathematization” of human relationships (Krissman, n.d.). But these problems are surmountable, and the benefits multiple. Mastery of a few precepts will suffice to follow the social network analysis of the case studies in Section IV.

Three principles, developed by the “Manchester school” (Mitchell, 1969; Scott, 2000:26-32), illustrate the utility of the international migration network. They help the researcher to identify all of the major actors, and to evaluate how the roles of each individual determine the varied functions these networks serve. The use of these principles transforms the network concept from metaphor to method, permitting theories to be constructed concerning the link between social behavior and network development (Leinhardt, 1977:xiv).

My main research goal is to trace the development of international migration networks. I identified a wide variety of actors that play important roles in the creation and perpetuation of these networks. After examining each actor I selected one that was the most appropriate anchor for the network that I was studying. In each case I chose a “pioneer migrant” (described in Section I, above), who recruits – with the aid of others – new immigrant workers for employers in the US. Only a pioneer could anchor these networks;²² this individual is the critical link between would-be migrants in the hometown and a US employer.

Principle one – “anchorage” – is the point of orientation of a network study (Mitchell, 1969:12). One individual must be selected as a “net anchor”, and that person provides the starting point from which all the other contacts are traced. As a glance at Figure 2 shows, the foreman's assistant is at the center of the diverse set of actors in this *sample* “sociogram”.²³ The supervisory “assistant” is linked to seven other network actors (via connecting lines). The next most linked actor is the “migrant worker”, who just went through the network to get to the US.

The second principle – “reachability” – measures the number of contacts any given member of the network requires to reach anyone else. While the assistant can reach seven network contacts directly, this individual has to go through one or more intermediaries to contact the other nine participants. His direct ties are to many other agents that provide services to would-be migrants. These ties link him indirectly to virtually every would-be migrant in his hometown. But, to recruit new migrants most effectively, the anchor is also directly accessible to many hometown adults. The assistant has elaborated ritual ties with many paisanos, and can offer a number of services to those wishing to go the US. However, his contact with the most critical exogenous actors (one of two possible US employers: an FLC or agribusiness owner) is indirect, indicating that he has a lower status in this international migration network hierarchy.

International migration networks would not exist without a high demand for immigrant labor. To fill this demand, either a formal or informal recruitment system will work. Employers, who create

the demand, are the one common high status actor in both systems. But employers are never at the *center* of these networks; they cannot anchor them. The reason underscores why anchorage and reachability are critical to tracing the development of these networks. Employers do need not to be in direct contact with many of the other members of these networks, as Figure 2 demonstrates. Instead, the contemporary system of informal recruitment relies on (subordinate or contracted) supervisory personnel, who recruit workers for employers. Indeed, many firm owners claim that they do not even know who recruits their workers for them (Krissman, 2000: 283). They are less likely to (want to) know their (often undocumented) workers, or the various actors that help these workers get from Mexico to US jobs. In essence, employers need the “plausible deniability” many politicians try to maintain, in case any sort of legal problem arises. Unreachability helps to provide this claim to non-responsibility. Regrettably, many immigration scholars have acceded to this convenient fiction in their own research of migrant networks.

The third principal – “directedness” – refers to the type(s) of links that different network participants have with one another. It reveals whether a relation is reciprocal or asymmetrical. The ideal, and to a lesser extent real, relationships among family and close friends are reciprocal, in spite of varied prerogatives that those of different statuses can claim (e.g., parents over children, males over females, etc.). It is perhaps easiest to recognize reciprocal relationships by contrasting them with clearly asymmetrical ones – that is, employer/employee, patron/client, or politician/voter (Wolf, 1962; Lomnitz, 1982; Mitchell, 1969:25).

To determine directedness within migration networks, I regard socioeconomic exchanges as crucial. Directedness is illustrated in the sample sociogram (Figure 2) by the arrows attached to the linking lines.²⁴ Reciprocal relationships have arrows at each end, while asymmetry is delineated by arrows pointing in one direction – toward the actor that gains the most from that relationship. Three of this net anchor’s relations are reciprocal – mutually beneficial business relationships with a coyote, the supervisor in a Mexico-based firm, and a landlord in the US. All of these actors provide some of the services that would-be migrants may require. The would-be migrant and new migrant worker are both subservient to the anchor, but the supervisory assistant in turn is a client of the supervisor and migrant association president.

The “migrant network” concept cannot provide any of this information. The Massey model does not have a network anchor, even though *Return to Aztlan* emphasized the importance of pioneer migrants in the development of large-scale migration flows. The current paradigm does not consider reachability, since all network participants are grouped together in one nested pyramid. All members are presumed to interact together with little regard, save relatedness, to the statuses or roles that differentiate the membership of virtually any social organization. Finally, that model actually dismisses the possibility that migrant networks might be manipulated to benefit any one individual or outside interest. Massey and colleagues argued that the migrant network emerges out of traditional hometown relationships predicated on labor exchange, cooperation, and mutual aid, while employers and their agents are excluded from the model, and only mentioned in an indirect and abstract manner.

IV. The Networks used by Two Groups of Indigenous Mexican Migrants

The following case studies document principal reasons *why* US growers may suddenly switch from one source of workers to another in their immigrant-dominated labor markets. Each case notes how new migrant workers are obtained, including those from communities without a long tradition of international migration. These cases demonstrate why a labor system dependent upon international migration continues to spread across larger regions of Mexico and the US. In addition, the nonmarket mechanisms by which US employers obtain unfree labor are evident in the case studies. While the importance of recruitment through the networks of current employees is particularly obvious in this post-Bracero era, the roles of various State agents still recur. Accompanying sociograms illustrate how the international migration networks operate, and why the most powerful actors within them seek to maintain this system of unfree labor.

Case #1

“Refugio Lopez” (a pseudonym), a forty-five year old indigenous Mixtec man, is a longtime worker in the San Joaquin Valley’s citrus industry and a recruitment agent for a farm labor contractor firm (FLC). During the past twenty years he has moved up the region’s farm job ladder from field harvester to foreman’s assistant, and – more recently – foreman. The bulk of this narrative, and the spot assigned to Refugio in the accompanying sociogram (see the “net anchor”, **Figure 3**), highlight his longtime role as a foreman’s assistant.

Refugio was raised in a remote hamlet near Tecomaxtlahuaca (known by its diminutive, **Teco**) in the southern Mexican state of Oaxaca. Refugio worked from age 7 to provide for himself (as well as to help support his mother and two siblings). He began earning his living by shepherding goats for a childless village couple, but at age 12 Refugio joined the hundreds of thousands migrating from the Mixteca. Refugio left Teco, first laboring in a Mexico City tortilla-producing plant for four years before working in the US-controlled agribusiness sector on a north Mexico tomato plantation until he was recruited to work in California’s tomato fields.

Refugio got a loan from his crew foreman at the Mexican tomato firm to smuggle himself, his girlfriend, and two of her brothers from Tijuana to Imperial County. The foreman also recommended a reliable smuggler. This California-based company finances production at the north Mexican firm, and imports their tomatoes to fill market orders each winter when climatic conditions make local production unprofitable. The Mixtec found that they had already been trained for the job in north Mexico – the relations and technologies of production on the farms on both sides of the border are quite similar, right down to packing product into boxes with the same label (Krissman, 1994; Zabin, n.d.). The main differences were in wages and working conditions; daily earnings were about twelve times greater, workplace safety and environmental regulations were enforced, and their foreman expected them to work “a hundred times harder” according to Refugio. The workers kept hearing that wages and working conditions were much better further north.

In 1981, at age 29, Refugio moved to the San Joaquin with his now common-law wife, the two brothers, and a family of paisanos that they met in Imperial County. A cousin of this family recommended all of them for work on his citrus harvest crew during a period of labor market instability. The firm, one division of a east coast-based conglomerate, controls more than 10,000 acres of navel oranges in the region. However, the firm was fighting off an organizing campaign by the United Farm Workers union. Finally, the firm divested itself of both its field labor and trucking operations in 1983. The company encouraged key supervisory personnel within these two divisions to become independent entrepreneurs, providing harvest labor and transport services under contract to the firm. These actions increased labor market instability.

Refugio was recruited into the new farm labor contracting firm (an FLC) through his foreman. The FLC offered the same piece-rate wage of ten dollars per 1,000 pound bin, but annulled previously negotiated (non-government mandated) benefits. Worker complaints about lost benefits were met with discharges. Meanwhile, the piece-rate remained static in the intervening eleven years, thereby declining more than 20 percent vis-a-vis the cost of living. The deteriorating conditions in the workplace ensure high employee turnover, and led to a recurrent need to replenish the crews. Refugio has obliged his foreman by recruiting paisanos from Teco.

By assisting the foreman Refugio benefitted in three ways. He enhanced his status within the Oaxacan expatriate community as a labor broker. He was awarded a “*raitero*” franchise (transporting seven to ten workers in his van each day at three dollars per person), increasing his earnings by 60 percent. Finally, he was promoted to the less arduous task of forklift operator. With this last change in status he agreed to increase his recruitment activities for the foreman, making Refugio responsible for half the 36 member crew. He says that this was not a problem, since he had been reinforcing preexisting ties to his migrant network. He has provided a “safe house” to scores of paisanos passing through in search of work along the far-flung Pacific migration circuit that many Mixtec travel. Refugio received residency documents in 1987, legalizing his role as a farm worker and allowing him to make return visits to Oaxaca without fear of problems when trying to reenter the US.

On his first return visit to Teco after an eleven year absence Refugio purchased a house lot and distributed gifts from California to family members. He expanded his relations beyond his close kin by helping to sponsor some of the celebrations – such as baptisms, communions, and weddings – that migrants indulge in during their visits home. Refugio himself had a rather elaborate Church wedding, pacifying the previously scandalized parish priest, and paving the way for his children to be baptized in the community. Refugio also joined a hometown association, which required a contribution to the club's president. Some of these funds were eventually used to improve the local soccer field. All of these acts reaffirmed Refugio's status as a member in good standing with the civil-religious authorities of his natal community.

With his new van, well-fed and -dressed family, and fat billfold, Refugio serves as yet another local example of the benefits of international migration, relative to the endemic poverty of the Mixteca. Refugio passes on information about living and working conditions in California to those considering a trip to the US, and has advanced loans to those who cannot afford to self-finance their migration. On trips back up north, Refugio often ferries new migrants in his van. At the border he meets the smuggler (*coyote*) who once helped him get across. This smuggler helps Refugio's undocumented companions across and reunites them with Refugio, waiting for them in San Diego. On several occasions, Refugio has driven down from his San Joaquin Valley home to the border in response to collect calls from migrants that need a ride north. A cousin living in Vista usually drives through the north county Border Patrol checkpoint, then calls down to San Diego to tell Refugio whether it is open or closed before he ventures north with his human cargo.

Indebted migrants stay with Refugio until transportation, housing, and meal expenses have been repaid through payroll deductions at 20-30 percent interest per month. As the cost of migrating to the US has risen, the length of indenture has increased, from about five weeks in 1988, to about four months in 1994. The size of Refugio's household during the winter/spring citrus harvest season averages about twenty-two adults – two thirds of his whole crew – and about five children. Refugio lodges them in various rooms in the house, as well as in several makeshift shelters placed about the lot.

In 1991 Refugio was elevated to foreman status by his patron, who began his own FLC. Refugio asserts that he is working harder and longer as a foreman than ever before. He stresses the difficult responsibility a foreman has to satisfy the grower and the FLC owner on the one hand, and his crew members on the other. He says that workers exert considerable influence on him to provide reasonable wages and decent working and living conditions. After all, he notes that these are his *paisanos*, even family members, not mere strangers.

Perhaps in part due to this tension, Refugio is often critical of the FLC owner, remarking that the patron earns too much money. Refugio has recited to me a litany of the possessions that the FLC owner has accumulated, including a restaurant (and two catering trucks that sell the restaurant's food to farm workers in the orchards), several houses, and ostentatiously equipped 4-wheel drive vehicles that the owner and other family members use to supervise the contractor's six harvest crews. However, Refugio has also displayed new wealth as a result of becoming a recruitment agent for the FLC. In 1990 he purchased an acre parcel with a ramshackle four-bedroom home and a number of outbuildings, where the constant flow of *paisanos* passing through can be more easily accommodated. And, he recently purchased a large van, permitting Refugio to carry fifteen workers to the field each day at three dollars per head.

Case #2

“Lorenzo Ramirez” (a pseudonym), a forty-four year old mestizo man, is an orchard supervisor that now oversees two crews of about 30 workers each for an intermediate-sized apple operation in Yakima Valley, Washington. Lorenzo used to prefer workers from his own Mexican hometown (see the “net anchor”, **Figure 4a**). However, as will be discussed below, a dispute led him to draft an intermediary from the ranks, who now recruits new workers from elsewhere.

Reared in Pajacuaran, in the western portion of the state of Michoacan, central Mexico,

Lorenzo migrated to the US at age 17 in 1970. He joined his father in Salinas, California, where they harvested lettuce and other vegetables. In 1975 this agribusiness firm was organized by the UFW, raising wages more than 40 percent and instituting benefits, including a seniority system which helped guarantee jobs for older farm workers such as Lorenzo's father in spite of their declining productivity. However, in 1979 the firm decertified the union and abolished the seniority system. His father "retired" to Pajacuaran, and the following year Lorenzo went further north, to the Yakima Valley in Washington state. Lorenzo's new employer had free housing in an orchard, and helped him regularize his residency status. Within a year five other disgruntled hometown workers left Salinas to follow Lorenzo north.

The grower is a farm equipment retailer who has purchased about 250 acres of apple orchards bit by bit, primarily from clients who either retired or went bankrupt. He also bought an antiquated packinghouse two years ago. The owner hopes that his version of vertical integration will help him to weather the notorious ups and downs for which the apple business is noted.²⁵ Lorenzo claims that the owner's interest in the orchards is limited to obtaining tax breaks that reduce his total liabilities. As he rose through the ranks, the owner provided Lorenzo with a salary, an orchard cottage, a company truck, and a simple mandate – to keep production costs low. Lorenzo says that he rose to the position of orchard supervisor in five years, becoming "both a general and private". In reality, he has a number of intermediate supervisory personnel between him and the "troops", including two foremen, three forklift operators, and an irrigation team. Lorenzo became a *paterfamilias* to obtain loyal assistants from among his large kindred.

In 1986 the US government prepared to award residency papers to more than 2 million "illegal aliens" under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (**IRCA**). Lorenzo's employer, fearful that the implementation of new border controls and an employer sanctions provision might lead to a labor shortage, paid Lorenzo to recruit new workers in Mexico. During his hometown visit, Lorenzo provided at least thirty paisanos with papers certifying that they had already worked at least ninety days picking apples. This letter allowed them to qualify for one of the residency programs. However, Lorenzo admits that only a few of them had ever been as far north as Yakima, while some had never even been in the US before.

Five paisanos claim that Lorenzo actually sold the certification papers for up to 500 dollars each. If true, Lorenzo and/or his employer may have earned more than 10,000 dollars from the sale of these letters. Two of these clients report borrowing the cash – about 2,000 dollars (for the papers, as well as subsistence and travel) – from a local moneylender rumored to be part of a family that traffics drugs (a *narcotraficante*). The two accusations, one concerning the selling of documents by Lorenzo and the other about the source of the moneylender's capital are widely repeated within the community, but are nonetheless unconfirmed.²⁶

The paisanos came to Yakima in 1987 as they had been instructed, only to find that the apple harvest was delayed due to unseasonable weather. Without adequate funds to support themselves, the men asked for help to purchase necessities. Lorenzo says that the grower refused to advance them wages due to uncertainty about the harvest. The paisanos began agitating for compensation for their long wait. The employer became edgy, worrying Lorenzo about the security of his own job. When the harvest finally did begin Lorenzo did not use eighteen of these paisanos. Although he claims that many of them owed him money for cash advances, Lorenzo says that he no longer had confidence (*confianza*) in these workers.

The Washington state Apple Commission, an industry-supported marketing agency with the sponsorship of the State, had responded to growers' fears concerning IRCA by unleashing an unprecedented advertising campaign in California to lure farm workers north during 1987. When the harvest was delayed the result was an industry-made disaster for thousands of desperate migrants stranded in rural Washington; the Commission settled a class action law suit brought on behalf of destitute workers for over 600,000 dollars in 1992. However, the unemployment crisis proved a boon for apple growers like Lorenzo's boss.

One of the paisanos that Lorenzo rejected when the harvest began had been one of his

forklift operators – his wife’s nephew. During the pre-harvest squabbling Lorenzo says he overheard this young man sympathizing with some of the new migrants, who were his *cuates* (buddies). In a break with previous practice, Lorenzo gave his nephew’s job to an indigenous worker from the municipality of Santa Clara del Cobre, in the Purepecha region of Michoacan (see “new net anchor”, **Figure 4b**). The new assistant, “Manuel Torres” (a pseudonym), had worked as a seasonal harvester in one of Lorenzo’s two crews for several years.

When Lorenzo’s troubles with his stranded paisanos became apparent, Manuel told him that he could recruit any replacement workers needed. A score of Manuel’s paisanos had contacted him after coming north to Yakima from California in response to the Commission’s advertising campaign. These workers were willing to bunk up, six per one-room cabin, until Lorenzo’s paisanos moved on in search of work elsewhere. Lorenzo still employs ten workers from Pajacuaran, but seven of them are close kin: a brother, two in-laws, and four of his own children. Lorenzo has delegated responsibility for obtaining the other fifty seasonal workers to Manuel, insulating himself from his employer, the workforce, and more conflicts with paisanos.

Manuel continues to recruit new seasonal workers from Santa Clara via contacts he has in California. These indigenous Mexicans have been migrating to the US for more than a decade, primarily to work March through July in the coastal strawberry industry in the Salinas Valley. When the berry harvest tapers off, an increasing number of these workers have decided to increase their annual earnings by extending their migratory cycle. The apple harvest in Washington, from August to October, offers a complementary seasonal opportunity. This option first came to their attention when the Washington Apple Commission engaged in its massive recruitment campaign in California in 1987.²⁷

I have only conducted preliminary fieldwork in Santa Clara, Michoacan. Therefore, Figure 4b lacks data on most of the actors that likely participate in its international migrant network (e.g., moneylenders, smugglers, officials of religious and secular organizations in Mexico, etc.). The figure does document the addition of the ten week apple harvest as a leg in a migratory circuit along the west coast. Nonetheless, the shifting pattern is suggestive in several respects. First, the sociogram documents the micro-level displacement of one group of Mexico-origin workers by another. Second, it reveals the continued development of network contacts by the members of an indigenous community in order to expand their wage earning activities abroad. And, third, it demonstrates the roles of actors not native to the migrants’ hometowns, including the members of quasi-governmental institutions such as the Washington state Apple Commission.

Lorenzo says has more free time since Manuel has taken charge of personnel issues. He has filled this time by beginning to participate in transnational activities. By demonstrating good citizenship and establishing reciprocal relations with important hometown actors (see Figure 4a, above) Lorenzo seems to be trying to repair the damage caused by asymmetrical relations he elaborated in the past, both in his Mexican hometown and in Washington.

Lorenzo’s family always buys a table or two at fund-raising events, such as those that contributed to the renovation of the hometown plaza. Indeed, Lorenzo has held office in the hometown’s migrant association. He also sponsored one of several house visits by the hometown parish priest. The priest traveled to Washington state to get the funds to complete a second church tower, which had languished for six decades. Lorenzo has gone to several political rallies in support of a leftist candidate for the Mexican presidency. This man, like his more successful father, had once been governor of Michoacan. But most important, in the past few years the family has vacationed in Pajacuaran during the Christmas season. Lorenzo is remodeling his hometown house, and is reconsidering his long-held retirement plans. He’s trying to envision some sort of business opportunity for his family in his sleepy hometown.

Lorenzo cannot countenance his sons following in his footsteps, yet knows that there are few opportunities for mobility outside of the farm labor market in rural Yakima. He says that the current situation for workers in the apple industry is untenable. Wages have been stagnant for more than a decade, while the farm workers' cabins have deteriorated due to age and high occupancy rates. The owner has expanded the size of his work crews, but total work hours per season have declined. Lorenzo claims that even his position is not well paid, estimating that his annual salary of 18,000 dollars breaks down to about seven dollars an hour. Although his family lives in an orchard cottage and he has a ranch pick-up truck at his disposal, Lorenzo claims that his standard of living has declined since coming to Washington. And his wife complains about the isolation of their rural orchard home, far from neighbors, stores, and other conveniences.

However, the isolation of living in far from town provides economic opportunities for those in supervisory positions. Workers have to pay a premium to buy any necessities, which Lorenzo stockpiles in an informal storeroom. Once a week Lorenzo or an assistant will ferry the workers to town, but still benefit in small ways from these trips. Of course the workers must pay for the "raite". Then, the owner of convenience store where the workers cash their paychecks gives Lorenzo a six-pack of beer for each check cashed (with a 5 percent cash-charging fee). Back at the orchard, Lorenzo puts the beer on ice and sells them back to the workers.

Conclusion

To be frank, studies of ethnic displacement are not new. In fact, Carole Zabin, Michael Kearney, Anna Garcia, David Runsten, and Carole Nangengast examined ethnic displacement in the groundbreaking *Mixtec Migrants in California Agriculture* in 1993. And they concluded "...mestizo workers are losing their jobs as growers replace them with Mixtecs who work at lower wages" (Zabin et al 1987:92). That said, why did I bother to write this paper now?

I wrote this paper because I "...look[ed] at the *process* of incorporation of a new group of workers..." (Zabin et al 1987:91), something the authors deemed important to documenting ethnic replacement. But I viewed the process differently. That was the impetus for this work.

First, I recognized that nonmarket mechanisms cannot deliver free labor. Both State-sponsored "guest worker" programs and the manipulation of employee networks by employers are alternate recruitment systems that employers use to recruit unfree labor. These recruitment systems have allowed growers to maintain substandard labor markets in the face of union and State pressures for reform for more than a century. Indeed, more employers in more industries throughout the US and around the globe are using these two mechanisms to obtain unfree labor.

Second, I replaced the prevailing model used by most immigration scholars with another that allowed me to include all of the actors involved in international migration networks. I coupled the alternative model with a different research methodology which allows researchers to examine and analyze the complex relationships among the actual actors in real international migration networks. By doing these things I found that it is the demand of employers for immigrant labor that drives this unfree labor system, not any of the (mainly reactive) survival strategies of undocumented migrants. In the absence of a sufficiently pernicious State recruitment program, employers will create and sustain migration networks via the asymmetrical relationships that they can develop with subordinate labor agents, who are themselves desperate to improve their socioeconomic conditions in these purposefully substandard labor markets.

Third, I wanted to urge researchers to stop helping employers evade responsibility on the immigration issue. *If* migration is a problem, the solution lies in US workplaces, not in any Mexican hometown. Employers should pay all of the costs of using undocumented immigrants.

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Notes

i. The Mexican census classifies about 10 percent of the nation's people as indigenous, and identifies scores of distinct indigenous populations dispersed throughout the nation. Distinctions between them and mestizos have been made based on a variety of criteria: so-called 'race' (phenotype), language, culture, economics, politics, and history. Two classics on the "mestizo/indigena" dichotomy – especially mestizo differentiation – are Wolf (1959) and MacLachlan and Rodriguez (1980). Other influential works include Pozas and Pozas (1971) and Stavenhagen (1975). The archive at the State's Instituto Nacional Indigenista is devoted to defining Mexican populations. Many of my informants from both reputedly mestizo and indigenous communities present conflicting identities in their statements and practices. I generally take the easy way out, presuming the identities of individuals and hometowns based mainly on those ascribed to them by academic and State sources.

ii. Mexican mestizos had only recently displaced a mix of domestic labor, such as African Americans and Whites long trapped in sharecropping arrangements, and Caribbean migrants from Puerto Rico, Haiti, Jamaica, and Barbados. Now Mixtec and Maya workers are replacing the recently preferred mestizos; note that the Maya span the Mexican-Guatemalan border. See Griffith and Kissam (1995), CAW (1993), and Heppel and Amendola, (1992:case 5).

iii. For examples, Runsten and Kearney (1984), Zabin et al (1993), CAW (1993), and Heppel and Amendola, (1992:cases 6 and 7).

iv. See, Zlolniski (2001), Lamphere et al (1994), Zabin et al (1993), Mines and Anzaldúa (1982), Fineberg (1971), Fisher (1953), and Williamson (1947).

v. I conducted binational fieldwork in the San Joaquin Valley and Oaxaca between 1988 and 1994. The Yakima Valley and Michoacan were studied between 1995 and 1998. My research was supported by two grants from the Wenner-Gren Foundation and the Center for US-Mexican Studies (UC San Diego), two stipends from the Urban Institute, and a fellowship from the Social Science Research Council, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Center for California Studies, North-South Center (U of Miami), and Agricultural Personnel Management Program (UC Berkeley).

6. See, Zabin et al (1993:93), Massey et al (1987:40-44), and Portes and Bach (1985:5-7).

7. Neither Giffith or Haney discussed another aspect of State involvement in the recruitment of immigrant labor – that is, so-called immigration enforcement (at the border and in the interior). While some immigration scholars regard federal policy and practice as merely contradictory, with many (and repeated) "unintended consequences" (e.g., Massey et al, 1987:321; Cornelius et al, 1994), I concur with others (Acuña, 1981; Burawoy, 1981; Cockcroft, 1986; Dunn, 1996; Castells, 1977) who argue that the State rides herd on immigrants to discipline and shape, but not necessarily eliminate or even reduce the flow of low cost labor into the labor-receiving nations.

8. See Mines (1981), Mines and Anzaldua (1982), *Valley Voice*, Zabin et al (1993), Wells (1996), and Krissman (1996).

9. See *Yakima* (6-3-1995, 12-18-1996, and 1-7-1997) on the union struggle, and *Yakima* (2-26 through 3-5-1995), Heppel and Amendola, (1992:case 3), CAW (1993), and Carkner and Jaksich (1993) on growers' fears of a labor shortage.

10. There is considerable overlap between my findings and those of Griffith (1987). We agree on the salience of ethnicity and legal status (which he refers to as "nationality"). However, I have added class differences due to my focus on hierarchies in the labor markets (Krissman, 2000) and intra-ethnic divisions within immigrant communities in the western US (Krissman, 2003), while he focuses on gender distinctions in the workplace. I have not found gender to be a major variable, although women comprise 20 to 80 percent of the labor at each workplace. But, see Thomas (1985) on gender in California's lettuce harvest labor market.

11. On the indictment of six executives at Tyson Foods for labor smuggling, and their recruiter, see *New York Times* (12-20-2001, 1-24-2002). For another case of employers and smuggling, see *Los Angeles Times* (11-27-1998). For farm worker slaves from Oaxaca, see *Los Angeles Times* (3-24-1992). For State complicity in human trafficking, see *New York Times* (7-20-1997).

12. For the worst cases, see Bales (1999); the CIA estimates that at least 50,000 slaves are smuggled annually into the US, mainly through Los Angeles. For abuses in a State-sponsored immigrant worker program, see Galarza (1963) and Gamboa (1990).

13. The subtitle of *Return to Aztlan*.

14. Not enough attention is given to the effects on migration networks of the hundreds of thousands of immigrants still recruited annually for crop, hospitality, high-tech, and other industries under the State's H1-A and -B programs (direct descendants of the Bracero program).

15. Immigrants from Europe, Asia, Africa, and other Latin American countries have followed the same pattern to enter a variety of labor markets (e.g., Piore, 1979; Cummings, 1982; Portes and Rumbaut, 1990; and Lamphere et al, 1994).

16. For example, Martin (1994), Lamphere et al (1994), Zabin et al (1993), and Piore (1979).

17. See Zabin (1992), Mines (1981:144), and Mines and Anzaldua (1982:87, 112).

18. Massey and Espinosa (1997:955) used data on total annual growth in US employment to estimate the demand for immigrant labor. However, Wayne Cornelius (1999:8) and Alejandro Portes and Robert Bach (1985:56, 57) documented the lack of a relationship between the use of

immigrant workers and overall employment. The former noted that the use of immigrant workers in California has not been influenced by domestic unemployment in the 1990s, while the latter demonstrated that immigration policy and inflows since World War II have been delinked from employment, and tied instead to fluctuations in the gross national product.

19. Actually, Hondagneu-Sotelo only discussed employer and employee networks. However, her depiction of the agencies (with names like “Malibu Mamas”!) is akin to FLCs. Kristin Hill Maher (2002), who focused on the agencies, does consider them a type of network for workers.

20. I argue – and the alternative model reflects this – that there are major differences between the networks which internal and international migrants use. The development of the Massey model can be traced to research on internal migrants, which may have had been one source of its flaws.

21. Recent examples include Schweizer and White (1998), Scott (2000) and Barabasi (2002).

22. On the one hand, many network actors have a “durability” problem (Mitchell, 1969:26). For example, new migrants only have short-term or onetime contact with many other actors in the network, losing contact with other participants after their objective is achieved. On the other hand, employers have a “reachability” problem, discussed in the text, below.

23. I have *created* Figure 3 to show as many possible international migration network actors as possible. It is a compilation of a variety of real networks, not itself a case study. Note too that it was too crowded with potential actors for me to draw all the links that they might share.

24. The dotted lines trace the various contacts a would-be migrant is likely to establish in order to enter the international migration network. In some cases the potential links represent alternative paths into the network. For example, in Figure 2 the would-be migrant could establish a link with either the Mexico agribusiness foreman *or* the foreman’s assistant in the US in order to obtain the services of the same coyote; however, to get a job with the FLC in the US the would-be migrant has to establish a link with the assistant – a labor recruiter for the FLC.

25. This businessman’s recent “fire-sale” acquisitions are evidence of the swings that the industry experiences. Growers are just above farm workers, at the bottom of the industry revenue chain. Farm workers and warehouse packers each get a nickel, growers a dime, and packinghouse owners get fifteen cents; that is why the trend in farming is vertical integration into packing. Wholesalers, transporters, and especially retailers take up the lion’s share of the dollar that an average pound of apples costs the consumer.

26. I include these data here largely because: 1) both stories were told by a number of unrelated informants; and, 2) each claim coincides with reports by sources outside the hometown.

27. However, there is already a well developed stream from the Purepecha Plateau to western Washington. Large numbers of workers from the over-studied community of Tzintzuntzan have been working as landscapers, builders, and restaurant workers in the Olympia-Tacoma-Seattle metro areas since the early 1980s (Rendon, 1996:387). Meanwhile, a small but rapidly growing settlement of Mixtec have settled two hours north of the Yakima Valley (near Wenatchee), and work in that regions' apple packinghouses.